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IN RE CONROY: SELF-DETERMINATION:
EXTENDING THE RIGHT TO DIE
Since Socrates consumed the hemlock, the focus of ethicists and philoso-
phers has often converged upon an individual's right to die.' While suicide
is not sanctioned as an ethical response or a protected right, recent judicial
decisions have confronted the dimensions of a patient's right to decline life-
sustaining measures and opt for a natural death.2 There is significant juridi-
cal discord as to the nature of this right, particularly as to its procedural and
substantive application.'
The examination of this sensitive area in this note will chart recent pat-
terns in legal analysis which are predominately shaped by ethical and medi-
cal traditions concerning life and death. Constitutionally protected personal
privacy zones fuse with these traditions resulting in judicial inclination to-
ward favoring the right to die.4 A reasoned response to right to die decisions
is suggested allowing the decision-making process to transpire in a scenario
unburdened by litigation and judicial interference. It is crucial to note that
the impetus of these decisions is the failure of the state legislatures to fashion
a realistic statutory response to the need for right to die legislation.5
I.
In 1976, the New Jersey courts pioneered the metamorphosis of this legal
area through their decision, In Re Quinlan.6 Most recently the court consid-
ered an incompetent nursing home patient's right to die in In Re Conroy.7
1. The phrase "right to die," as used by most legislatures, courts and commentators
refers only to the right to die naturally. See, e.g., Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1
to- 10 (Cum. Supp. 1983) (permitting only the right to die naturally).
2. See infra notes 6, 9, 14, 16, 17.
3. Id.
4. See infra notes 9, 12, 16 and accompanying text.
5. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985). The court commented that "[i]n the
absence of specific legislation on the termination of life-sustaining treatment, we may not prop-
erly avoid the issue that we have been asked to resolve merely because it is troubling or diffi-
cult. Every day, and with limited legal guidance, families and doctors are making decisions for
patients like Claire Conroy." 98 N.J. at 344, 486 A.2d at 1221. See also Howell, Caretakers
Views on Responsibilities for the Care of the Demented Elderly, 325 AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y
657, 658-59 (1984); Hilfiker, Sounding Board: Allowing the Debilitated to Die, 308 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 716 (1983).
6. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
7. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). See Cantor, Conroy, Best Interests, and the Han-
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Quinlan8 upheld an incompetent's
right to refuse, through a guardian, the continued use of life-support sys-
tems. This ruling was premised upon constitutionally protected zones of
personal privacy.9 Relying upon the New Jersey Constitutionl ° and the
United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade," the Quinlan court
analogized that since the right to privacy protects an individual's privilege to
obtain certain types of health care, inversely its zones must also protect the
right to refuse care.12 In order to prevent destruction of this right, the New
Jersey Supreme Court permitted the guardian and family of Karen Quinlan
to exercise her right by proxy, subject to a judicial and medical
qualification. 13
Almost a decade after In Re Quinlan, the Florida Supreme Court recog-
nized that a family may exercise an incompetent's right to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment in John F Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Bludworth."
ding of Dying Patients, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 543 (1985) (hereinafter cited as Cantor); Note,
Natural Death: An Alternative in New Jersey: In re Conroy, 73 GEo. L. J. 1331 (1985).
8. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
9. Id. at 39-42, 355 A.2d at 663-64. At the time of the case, Karen Quinlan was a
twenty-two year old woman in a chronic vegetative state due to anoxia of unknown origin.
Although not clinically brain dead, she existed at a primitive level and totally required assist-
ance with life's basic functions such as breathing, eating, and excretion. Karen's father sought
appointment as her guardian with express authority to order withdrawal of all extraordinary
medical treatment. He asserted that the use of the respirator violated Karen's free exercise of
religion, constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and violated her right of personal privacy.
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the first two claims but concurred in the privacy
argument. It was on this basis that the court granted Mr. Quinlan's petition.
10. N.J. CONST. art. I, par. I. (This provides for "certain natural and unalienable rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life.").
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Ms. Roe, a pregnant single woman, brought a class action chal-
lenging the constitutionality of a Texas statute which prohibited abortion except when neces-
sary to save the mother's life. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the
statute was void for vagueness and infringed her personal right of privacy. The district court
granted declaratory relief and held that the abortion statute did infringe on Roe's right of
privacy, in contravention of the ninth amendment. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1223
(N.D. Tex. 1970). On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed this portion of the lower
court ruling but took the position that the right of privacy derives from the fourteenth amend-
ment. 410 U.S. at 153.
12. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. The court ruled that this privacy right is not
absolute, but subject to legitimate state interests. According to the court, "the state interest
contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion
increases and the prognosis dims." The court subordinated the state's interest to Quinlan's
rights. See also Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30
RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 244 (1977); Annas, In re Quinlan: Legal Comfort for Doctors, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., June 1976, at 29; Wolhander, Voluntary Active Euthanasia For the Ter-
minally Ill and the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 363 (1984).
13. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
14. 452 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1984). This case involved a hospitalized patient surviving on a
respirator. The patient could not breathe without the respirator's assistance due to impaired
In Re Conroy
Unlike the Quinlan decision, the Florida court declined to require prior judi-
cial approval of the withdrawal of treatment and ruled that intimate family
members or appointed guardians may discharge the incompetent's right to
refuse extraordinary medical treatment.15
Diverse state courts have addressed the issue of whether a terminally ill
patient may refuse life-sustaining medical treatment and several have recog-
nized common law and constitutionally sanctioned privacy zones protecting
such decisions, subject to legitimate state interests. 16 Others have rejected
this approach upon the premise that "the most basic right enjoyed by every
human being is the right to life itself."' 7
Natural death acts have been enacted in twenty-one states'" since 1976.19
neurological and respiratory functions. The attending physician diagnosed the condition as
terminal. Six years previous to his hospitalization, the patient had executed a living will, ex-
pressing his desire not to be kept alive by artificial means. The court declined to give primary
effect to the living will, but rather, allowed the family to exercise his rights to withdraw life-
support systems under the doctrine of "substituted judgment" (donning the mental mantle of
the incompetent). See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 751-52, 370 N.E. 2d at 431 (quoting In Re
Carson, 39 Misc.2d 544, 545; 241 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962)). See also Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hospital, No. 85E - 0009 - G1, (Mass. Norfolk Division, October 21,
1985). In a case with issues similar to Conroy, a Massachusetts Superior Court is currently
considering the future of Paul L. Brophy who has been in a permanent vegetative state since
1983. His family desires to withdraw sources of fluids and nutrients from Brophy under a legal
rationale akin to that adopted in Conroy.
15. Emphasizing that an attending physician and two specialists (in the field related to the
patient's illness) should certify that the patient is in a vegetative state with no reasonable
chance of recovery, before family members or the patient's guardian request the termination of
any medical treatment. Bludworth, 452 So.2d at 926.
16. See Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980) (incompe-
tent's right to refuse medical treatment may be expressed through a guardian when the patient
is in a chronic vegetative state); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (constitutional
privacy right supports the decision of a competent adult, suffering from a terminal illness, to
refuse extraordinary treatment); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (right to refuse medical treatment for terminal illness ex-
tended to incompetent patients); Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426
N.E.2d 809 (1980) (right to privacy includes the right of a terminally ill patient in a vegetative
state to decide the course of his own treatment); In Re Welfare of Coyler, 99 Wash.2d 114, 660
P.2d 738 (1983) (constitutional right to privacy includes the right of a terminally ill adult
patient to refuse life prolonging treatment, subject to countervailing state interests); Storar v.
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981)
(common law right to self-determination includes the right to refuse medical treatment in
some circumstances).
17. Maine Medical Center v. Houle, No. 74-145 (Me. Super Ct., Cumberland County,
February 14, 1974).
18. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to 22-8A-10 (supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to
82-3804 (Michie Supp. 1983); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1983);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-09 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to 6-2430 (Michie
Supp. 1983); LIFE-PROLONGING PROCEDURE AcT OF FLORIDA, ch. 84-58, 3 FLA. SESS. LAW
SERV. 40 (West 1984); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-I to 31-32-12 (Michie Supp. 1984); IDAHO
1986]
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This right to die legislation gives effect to a written declaration2' by an indi-
vidual, stating her desire not to have life artifically prolonged if death is at
hand and she is unable to speak for herself. State laws authorizing such
validly executed documents relieve the physician, staff and hospital from
civil and criminal liability for removing or withholding life-sustaining treat-
ment 2' from an incompetent patient in a terminal condition.
22
The recent judicial resolution of the plight of Claire Conroy, a case mired
in a myriad of constitutional, ethical, medical and moral questions, chal-
lenges both the judges' and physicians' competence in their respective mis-
sions to "do justice" and "to heal." Unlike the court's task in Quinlan, the
New Jersey court in Conroy was faced with an elderly, incompetent nursing
home patient, confined to a bed and surviving in a semi-fetal position.2 3
CODE §§ 39-4501 to 39-4508 (Michie Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, §§ 701-710
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 101 to 65-28, 101 to 65-28, 109
(1980)); Act. of Apr. 16, 1984, ch. 365, 1984 Miss. Law 98; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 to
449.690 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-77-1 to 24-7-11 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320
to 90-323 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 to 97.090 (1981); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (Supp. 1984); VA.
CODE §§ 54-325.8:1 to 54-325.8:13 (Michie Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 70.122.010 to 70.122.905 (West Supp. 1983-84); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to 16-30-10
(Michie Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to 154.15 (Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. §§ 33-
26-144 to 33-26-152 (Michie Supp. 1984).
19. California enacted the first natural death act in the United States. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1983) (enacted 1976).
20. Florida also recognizes a witnessed oral statement. LIFE-PROLONGING PROCEDURE
ACT OF FLORIDA, ch. 84-58, §§ 3-4, 3 FLA. SEss. LAW SERV. 40, 41-42 (West 1984); see also
VA. CODE § 54-325.8:2 (Michie Supp. 1984).
21. Generally, the acts limit their coverage to life-sustaining procedures and do not cover
curative measures. The definition of life-sustaining procedures varies among jurisdictions.
Most acts define life-sustaining procedures as medical procedure or intervention which, by
artificial or mechanical means, "only serves to prolong the moment of death." Excluded from
the definition of life-sustaining procedures in most acts are procedures necessary to provide
comfort, care, or to alleviate pain. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2 § 702 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1984-85); ORE. REV. STAT. § 97.050 (1981); Wyo. STAT. § 33-26-144 (Michie Supp.
1984).
22. Many acts define a terminal condition as an incurable condition resulting from illness,
disease, or injury which would cause death regardless of the application of life-sustaining pro-
cedures. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 24-7-2 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.050 (1981); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
4590h § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5252 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.122.020 (West Supp. 1983-84); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-2 (Michie Supp. 1984).
The words "would cause death regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures"
seem to exclude the situation where a person may be kept alive on life support indefinitely.
Other legislatures have avoided this problem by defining a terminal condition as a condition
which would cause imminent death if life-support was not applied. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 449.590 (1983).
23. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 341, 486 A.2d at 1219. Claire Conroy died while this case was
pending from an appeal from order allowing her guardian to remove the nasogastric conduit.
In Re Conroy
Conroy suffered from severe physical impairments including arteriosclerosis,
heart disease, hypertension, diabetes mellitus and possessed a severely lim-
ited intellectual capacity.24 Unable to discern or respond to verbal stimuli,
there was no tangible scientific evidence that Conroy was capable of higher
functioning or experienced consciousness.2 5 Physicians characterized her
physical and mental impairments as irreversible2 6 yet they did not consider
her condition to be painful.2 7 Claire Conroy's only surviving blood rela-
tive2" was appointed guardian and sought removal of a nasogastric feeding
tube which was her sole source of life-sustaining nutrients.29 Physicians con-
sidered that removing the tube would lead to Conroy's death, due to dehy-
dration, within one week.3 °
The trial court reasoned that the legal focus required the ad hoc balancing
of whether life for the patient had become impossibly and permanently bur-
densome.31 The court concluded that prolonging such a life would be an
unjustified state infringement of Conroy's protected zone of privacy and
would be pointless and cruel. 32 Owing to Conroy's primitive cognitive func-
tions and the burdens of such a life, the trial court sanctioned her guardian's
request and ordered the nasogastric conduit removed.
33
The Appellate Division reversed, ruling in the wake of Quinlan, that the
guardian's judgment is limited to the termination of life-sustaining treatment
only when a terminally ill patient is brain dead, irreversibly comatose and
vegetative, and when continued treatment would render no putative medical
benefit. 34 Alternatively, this court held that such an active deprivation of a
basic necessity of life such as food, provided to Conroy through the nasogas-
tric tube, would hasten the dying process, rather than simply allowing death
to transpire naturally.35 The court reasoned that such action would be com-
Due to the legal significance of whether life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn from an
incompetent, institutionalized, elderly patient with severe mental and physical impairments





28. Id., at 339, 486 A.2d at 1218. Ms. Conroy's sole relative was her nephew and guard-
ian, Thomas Whittemore. Whittemore knew Conroy for over fifty years and had visited her
regularly for some years prior to this action. The nephew's intentions were not in dispute and
there was no conflict of interest arising from a possible inheritance.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 188 N.J. Super. 523, 457 A.2d 1232 (Ch. Div. 1983).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 190 N.J. Super. 453, 460, 464 A.2d 303, 306 (App. Div. 1983).
35. Id. at 469, 464 A.2d at 312. "Some commentators have contended that nourishment
1986]
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mensurate to killing Conroy and that such active euthanasia was ethically
and legally impermissible.36 The appeals court decision follows an ethical
and legal tradition which holds the sanctity of human life above all individ-
ual rights, both as a societal value and as a necessary ingredient to the public
well-being. 7
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed in a narrow ruling limited to the
circumstances where life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn from elderly
nursing home patients suffering serious, permanent mental and physical im-
pairments, who will nonetheless die within a year with continued treat-
ment.38  Furthermore, the court required that there be a judicial
determination of incompetence antecedent to such a decision, with a finding
that the patient is unlikely to regain competence.39
In its decision, the court enunciated three legal standards. Under the sub-
jective rule, life-sustaining treatment, including sources of nutrients, may be
withheld or withdrawn from a patient when it is clear in the surrounding
circumstances, that the patient would have refused the treatment. 40 Ad-
vance directives such as living wills, oral directives to family members, ap-
pointment of proxy and previous reactions the patient voiced regarding
treatment given to others similarly situated, are relevant evidence of the pa-
tient's subjective intent.41 The patient's religious beliefs and the principles of
that religion are to be considered when appropriate.42
The limited objective rule would allow the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment if there is some trustworthy evidence that the patient would have
refused treatment concurrent with the decisionmaker's satisfaction that
clearly, the "burdens of the patient's continued life with the treatment out-
weigh the benefits of that life for [her].",43 However, in order to trigger this
standard, the party petitioning the court must proffer trustworthy evidence
that the patient would have wanted'the treatment terminated. 4"4 Further,
medical evidence must establish that the onerousness of the treatment, in
terms of pain and suffering to the patient, supercedes the benefits wrought by
has a special symbolic significance-involving human compassion-which differentiates it
from other aspects of treatment. Cantor, supra note 7, at 552.
36. Id. at 475, 464 A.2d at 312.
37. See Hegland, Unauthorized Rendition of Life Saving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L.
REV. 860 (1965); See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1978).
38. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 342, 486 A.2d at 1219.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229.
41. Id. at 362-63, 486 A.2d at 1229-30.
42. Id. at 362, 486 A.2d at 1230.
43. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
44. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
In Re Conroy
such a regimen.4 5 The court gives special attention to pain and suffering"
without treatment and the availability of drugs and other means to reduce
such hardship, short of terminating life-sustaining measures.4 7 Other factors
to be considered include the patient's life expectancy, her prognosis, level of
functioning, humiliation, dependency and treatment options.4" Justice Han-
dler's separate opinion criticizes the court's emphasis upon pain as a deter-
minative factor within the decisionmaking process.4 9 Due to the availability
of new drugs and techniques, pain may be reduced to endurable levels with-
out undesirable side-effects.50 Justice Handler further asserts that health
care professionals often find evaluating the degree of pain experienced by a
patient to be problematic. 5 The pain standard is alternately considered to
be a possible barrier to the justified termination of life-support systems, when
other factors militate in favor of ending treatment.5 2
The third standard operative in the absence of any evidence that the pa-
tient would have subjectively desired termination of the life-sustaining treat-
ment5 3 is the pure objective test.54 Like the limited objective rule, the pure
objective test allows termination of life-sustaining treatment when the "net
burdens of the patient's life with the treatment should clearly and markedly
outweigh the benefits the patient derives from life." 55 Furthermore, "the
recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life with the treat-
ment should be such that the effect of administering life-sustaining treatment
would be inhumane." 56 The New Jersey Supreme Court explicitly refused to
45. Id. at 365-66, 486 A.2d at 1232.
46. The court found no exploration of the discomfort and risks attendant to nasogastric
feedings. Conroy, 98 N.J. 321 at 387, 486 A.2d at 1243. Justice Handler, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, criticized the majority's focus upon pain in fashioning its rule based on
his belief that "health care providers frequently encounter difficulties in evaluating the degree
of pain experienced by a patient [in Conroy's condition]. Id. at 394-95, 486 A.2d at 1247
(Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Furthermore, Handler notes the ready
availability of drugs and techniques to reduce pain, in almost all patients, with negligible side
effects. See J. TwYCRoss, RELIEF OF PAIN IN THE MANAGEMENT OF TERMINAL DISEASE
71 (Saunders ed. 1978); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS
IN MEDICINE AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 50-51 (1983).
47. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 366, 486 A. 2d at 1232.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 394, 486 A.2d at 1247 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 394-95, 486 A.2d at 1247.
52. Id. at 395, 486 A.2d at 1248.
53. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
54. Id. The court recognized that regardless of pain, life-sustaining treatment should not
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attach value to such variables as personal economic worth or the patient's
social utility or her value to others.5
11. THE CONROY PROCEDURE
Noting the special vulnerability of the nursing home population,5" the
Conroy court offered a procedure distinct from that used in Quinlan to im-
plement one's right to terminate life-sustaining measures."9 In order to elicit
these procedures and surrogate decisionmaking, there must be a judicial de-
termination that the patient is incompetent.6" Incompetence will be pre-
mised upon an inability to understand imparted information, evaluation of
options or communication of decisions. 6 1 Two physicians with expertise in
relevant fields, who have personally examined the patient must submit infor-
mation bearing on her relative competence.6 2 Proof must also be clear and
convincing that the patient will not regain competence.6" At this juncture, a
guardian will be appointed or, if the patient already has a guardian, the court
will decide whether this person is suitable to represent the patient.61
The New Jersey Office of Ombudsman, 65 established by legislative action
57. Id. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232-33.
58. The court stipulates that nursing home patients are quite elderly, the average age
being eighty-two. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 375, 486 A.2d 1209, 1237 (1986) (citing S. REP.
No. 1420, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974)). Most nursing home patients suffer severe chronic or
crippling disabilities and those who enter a home usually die there. Social isolation is severe
and fewer than half of these patients have close, surviving family members. S. REP. No.
1420, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 91974). Physicians play a more limited role in nursing homes
than in hospitals and generally are not chosen by the residents, S. REP. No. 1420, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 323-24 (1974) (Supporting Paper No. 3), and generally are neither chosen by their
patients, nor are they familiar with their patients' personalities and preferences. Decisions to
Withhold Treatment from Nursing Home Residents, 31 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 602, 603
(1983). Furthermore, the contemporary nursing home industry, as an institution, suffers "pe-
culiar" industry-wide problems to which hospitals are less prone. S.REP. No. 1420, 93d
CONG., 2D SEss. III (1974).
59. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 374-75, 486 A.2d at 1237 (1985).
60. Id. at 380, 486 A.2d at 1240. The court stipulates that the judicial determination at
hand satisfies fourteenth amendment due process considerations as well as ethical demands.
See also Veatch, An Ethical Framework for Terminal Care Decisions: A New Classification of
Patients, 32 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 665, 668 (1984).
61. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 382, 486 A. 2d at 1241.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 383, 486 A.2d at 1241. If the patient already has a guardian, the court will
inquire into that person's suitability. Such a determination will include the guardian's knowl-
edge of the patient and her motivations or possible conflicts of interest. In the absence of a
guardian, the court will appoint a suitable person to provide treatment decisions for the
incompetent.
65. The Office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly is charged with re-
sponsibility to guard against abuse of such elderly patients.
In Re Conroy
to safeguard the institutionalized elderly from abuse, is to receive notifica-
tion by interested persons66 that the withdrawal of life-sustaining measures
would effectuate the incompetent's wishes or be in her best interests.67
Those believing the contrary to be so are to also contact the Ombudsman
who is to treat all such notifications as possible abuse, investigate the situa-
tion and report it within twenty-four hours to the Commissioner of Human
Services.68
The Ombudsman then appoints two physicians unaffiliated with either the
nursing home or the attending physician, to confirm the attending physi-
cian's medical prognosis of the patient.69 If the necessary medical founda-
tion is satisfied, the guardian, with the concurrence of the attending
physicians, the Ombudsman and the patient's family,70 may withhold life-
sustaining medical treatment. 7' Such a withholding must be made in good
faith and based upon medical evidence and any evidence of the patient's
wishes in order to clearly satisfy either the subjective, limited objective or
pure objective tests.7 2 The Conroy court grants civil and criminal immunity
for those acting in the absence of bad faith, in accordance with the Conroy
procedure.3
III. THE BASIS IN PRIVACY
The New Jersey Supreme Court admitted that it was not the most compe-
tent forum to resolve questions of essentially ethical and societal value. 74 It
viewed the legislature as the superior body to make such a determination,
both as factfinder and as an intimate monitor of the public pulse.75 In a
vacuum of legislation and confronting situations such as Claire Conroy's in
the absence of legal guidance, the Conroy court plunged into the imprecisely
charted, value laden waters of constitutional privacy.
The Conroy court, following in the footsteps of Quinlan, found that the
fundamental constitutional right to personal privacy is "broad enough to
66. The court refers to close family members, the patient's guardian, the attending physi-
cian or the nursing home itself as "interested parties." Conroy, 98 N.J. at 383, 486 A.2d at
1241.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 384, 486 A.2d at 1242.
69. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 384, 486 A.2d at 1242.
70. Neither the spectre nor the significance of familial disagreement over the withholding
or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is raised by the court.
71. 98 N.J. at 384, 486 A.2d. at 1242.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 385, 486 A.2d at 1242.
74. Id. at 344, 486 A.2d at 1220.
75. Id. at 344-45, 486 A.2d at 1221.
19861
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encompass a patient's [own] decision to decline medical treatment under cer-
tain circumstances.", 76 The United States Supreme Court has never ad-
dressed this point and has vaguely fashioned the boundaries of the
fundamental right of privacy in such landmark decisions as Griswold v. Con-
necticut7 7 and Roe v. Wade.78 The only certainty which emanates from
these decisions giving the privacy right substance, is that specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights such as the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth
amendments have penumbras assuring personal zones of privacy against
state infringement.79 United States Supreme Court doctrine articulating this
right focuses upon "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, childrearing and education .. 8.0 It is within these
values that Claire Conroy's right was properly fashioned."'
The Conroy decision alternately embraces the common law right to self-
determination as an independent matrix to the right to decline medical treat-
ment in certain circumstances.8 2 However, this right is not absolute and is
qualified by legitimate state interests.8 3 The four countervailing societal in-
terests articulated which may attenuate medical treatment refusal rights are
preserving life, preventing suicide, safe-guarding the medical profession and
protecting innocent third parties.8 4
The most compelling of the four state interests is the preservation of life
concern, encompassing two related strata: the interest in preserving the life
76. Id. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1223.
77. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
78. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
79. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
80. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
81. A distinguished commentator notes, "There is much that is sound and useful in Con-
roy. Its articulation of legal principles applicable to medical response to death and dying is as
persuasive and comprehensive as that provided by any court to date." Cantor, supra note 7, at
577.
82. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1233. Accord Storar v. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,
376-77, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70, 438 N.Y.S. 2d 266, 272-73, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). See
also Cantor, supra note 7, at 547 (The author states that the advantages in basing the self-
determination right in the common law are several. "First, the patient does not have to worry
about establishing state action in order to assert his right. His claim is as applicable to a
private hospital or private practitioner as it is to a government sponsored institution subject to
the fifth or fourteenth amendments. Further, the opportunity for collecting damages when
medical sources override the patient's right is enhanced. The patient, or patient's estate, can
invoke the well-established tort doctrine of informed consent without having to cope with the
more uncertain strictures of constitutional torts. Through the common law, the moribound
patient is likely to have firmer legal footing in his effort to compel medical sources to respect




of the particular patient and the interest in preserving life qua life.85 This
abstract state interest usually will give way to a competent patient's much
stronger interest in directing his own life.86 An incompetent patient's inter-
est vests in the judicially appointed guardian as the valued reflection of self-
determination. The state suicide interest is not activated in the Conroy or
Quinlan scenarios. The distinction, leveled in degrees, is between self-inflic-
tion or self-destruction and self-determination.87 In both cases death results
from the underlying disease rather than from a self-inflicted injury.88
The third interest, safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession, is
dismissed by the Conroy court through two policy considerations. First, the
ethics of the medical profession do not direct heroic intervention at all costs
in the instance of a competent patient refusing life-sustaining treatment.89
Thus, the free exercise of this self-determination right encompassed within
constitutionally protected privacy zones, does not threaten the integrity of
the healing arts professions. Secondly, if the right to informed consent is to
be afforded meaningful value, it must be respected even when conflicting
with medical advice or normative medical values.'
Finally, the State's interest in protecting third parties who may be harmed
by the patient's treatment decision supersedes the right to refuse treatment
in only a few scenarios and is given little weight by the New Jersey court.
However, some courts require individuals to undergo some treatment to pro-
tect the public health, 9' such as in instances of epidemic, or to safeguard the
lives of minors over parental religious objections.92
The balance exercised by the Conroy court results in the individual inter-
est considered ascendent to any state interest.93 Cases holding otherwise
either dispute the premise of the quality of life analysis or are those where
the rational capabilities of the patient are in dispute.94 It is at this juncture,
however, that the Conroy decision parts with recently established jurispru-
dence and vests the patient's penumbral and common law privacy rights in
85. Id. See Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30
RUTGERS L. REV. 239, 249 (1977); Annas, In Re Quinlan: Legal Comfort for Doctors, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., June 1976, at 29.
86. Id.
87. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 351, 486 A.2d at 1224.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 352-53, 486 A.2d at 1225.
91. Id.; see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
92. Id.; see also Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hospi-
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the judicially appointed guardian. To act otherwise effectively destroys the
incompetent patient's protected privacy zones and renders the value of self-
determination meaningless. Since Quinlan, the New Jersey court has recog-
nized the proxy assertion of an incompetent's privacy interests, premised
upon the notion that incompetency does not affect a surrendering of legal
rights.
95
The procedural aspects of Conroy and the use of the subjective, limited
objective and pure objective tests duly protects the incompetent patient from
malfeasance on the part of the guardian or the attending medical profession-
als. As a matter of both policy and urgency, the law of In re Conroy is a
sound approach in the midst of sociological change, the aging of America,
and legislative inability to fashion effective, responsive law to meet this
challenge.
IV. THE ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DILEMMA
The Conroy court rejects a common distinction often drawn between ac-
tive euthanasia 96 and passive euthanasia97 as "too nebulous to constitute a
principled basis for decision making."9'  In 'doing so, it seeks to justify its
orders to remove the nasogastric conduit, the sole source of nourishment for
Claire Conroy. Some commentators and theologians regard provisions of
food and water as falling within the realm of ethically required, ordinary
medical treatment.99 By sanctioning the withdrawal of life-sustaining nutri-
ents, the New Jersey Supreme Court accepts, as critics may contend, "the
thin edge of the wedge," thus preparing the way for legalization of involun-
tary euthanasia.'I°
The Conroy decision also challenges Roman Catholic doctrine on euthana-
sia. 10 This doctrine would reject the Conroy analysis as a posture actively
inducing the death of a person through dehydration.'0 2 Hence, the Conroy
95. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 35, 355 A.2d at 661.
96. See Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life.Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily
Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 Rutgers L. Rev. 228, 258-62 (1975); RACHELS,
Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEw ENG. J. MED. (1975) (hereinafter cited as Rachels).
97. Id.
98. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 370, 486 A.2d at 1225.
99. See Rachels, supra note 96.
100. Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42
MiN. L. REv. 969 (1958).
101. Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "Declaration on Euthanasia," (offi-
cial declaration of the Roman Catholic Church, approved by Pope John Paul II on May 5,
1980).
102. Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "Declaration on Euthanasia," (Offi-
cial declaration of the Roman Catholic Church, approved by Pope John Paul II on May 5,
1980).
In Re Conroy
law may be violative of Church principles on two grounds. First, the deci-
sion may be seen as a dislocation of the normal care due a patient under any
circumstances.10 3 Secondly, the Conroy rule divides the union with Christ's
Passion that Christians share through their own suffering at death.' °4
Although the court has found these considerations unpersuasive, these are
the ethical and religious challenges confronting the Conroy doctrine and sub-
sequent judicial action which is sure to ensue in the midst of this decision.
As the American pro-life movement has challenged the Roe v. Wade deci-
sion, due, in good measure, to moral and religious objections, any judicial
extension of the right to die will, in all likelihood, encounter similar political
resistance. Whether such religious arguments should be given credence in
American law raises strong constitutional questions. Justice Frankfurter ex-
plicitly rejected such considerations since "under our Constitution a state is
disabled from legislating... on religious grounds ... ,,105 The Establish-
ment Clause within the first amendment is the promulgation of the Foun-
ders' intent to rid governmental processes from the taint of religious
influence, both "root and branch." The constitutional tradition is to main-
tain a high and impregnable wall between church and state."l
The ability of the courts to radically reshape a substantial area of the law
by a single decision is very limited. Instead, such a burden must be met by
the various state legislatures, as science becomes more complex and further
beyond the layman's and the judiciary's competence. Life, itself, may be
prolonged by such incredible scientific progress. Therefore, it is necessary
for the law to remit such important and personal determinations to a more
appropriate sphere-the patient, family, physican relationship. In such a
competent forum, the privacy interest is expressed in a fuller and more
meaningful fashion where legal doctrine and precedent may give way to
faith, humanity, understanding and the spirit of the Hippocratic Oath.
Thomas H. Somers
103. Id. at 10.
104. Id. at 6; See also Matthew 27:34.
105. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 459 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
106. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Some commentators have argued
that the position taken by the Court is not based on a sound analysis of the Founders' intent.
The purpose of the first amendment was not to keep government and religion separated, but
rather "to forbid the Federal Government from interfering in the manner in which state gov-
ernments dealt with religion." C. ANTINEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM
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